Shipping Estimate
USA
- USA
- CAN
- USA
- CAN
Ships within 48 hours · Estimated delivery Jul 9 - Jul 14
Promo Codes Available:
For Your Every Summer RSVP, with Code: SUMMER15
Description
3HAC023754-008 ABB Robot Cable Harness3HAB5760 1 3HAB7320 1 3hab7424 1 3HAB8440 1 3HAB9398 1 3HAC020677 001 3HAC021827 001 3HAC021828 003 3HAC022544 001 3HAC022544 008 3HAC022545 001 3HAC022545 007 3HAC022723 001 3HAC022723 004 3HAC022723 005 3HAC022723 006 3HAC022957 001 3HAC022957 002 3HAC022957 003 3HAC022957 006 3HAC022978 001 3HAC022978 002 3HAC022978 003 3HAC022978 006 3HAC022988 001 3HAC022988 002 3HAC022988 006 3HAC022988 003 3HAC022996 001 3HAC022997 001 3HAC022999 001 3HAC023195
3HAB5760-1
3HAB7320-1
3hab7424-1
3HAB8440-1
3HAB9398-1
3HAC020677-001
3HAC021827-001
3HAC021828-003
3HAC022544-001
3HAC022544-008
3HAC022545-001
3HAC022545-007
3HAC022723-001
3HAC022723-004
3HAC022723-005
3HAC022723-006
3HAC022957-001
3HAC022957-002
3HAC022957-003
3HAC022957-006
3HAC022978-001
3HAC022978-002
3HAC022978-003
3HAC022978-006
3HAC022988-001
3HAC022988-002
3HAC022988-006
3HAC022988-003
3HAC022996-001
3HAC022997-001
3HAC022999-001
3HAC023195-001
3HAC023195-003
3HAC023278-001
3HAC023599-001
3HAC023754-008
3HAC024328-001
3HAC024328-005
3HAC024330-001
3HAC024330-004
3HAC024385-001
3HAC024386-001
3HAC025504-001
3HAC025054-001
3HAC025600-001
3HAC025600-005
3HAC025600-006
3HAC026225-002
3HAC026443-001
3HAC026787-001
3HAC026787-002
3HAC026787-003
3HAC026787-004
3HAC026787-005
3HAC027104-001
3HAC028357-001
3HAC029420-001
3HAC029705-001
3HAC029834-003
3HAC029834-005
3HAC029834-010
3HAC029834-011
3HAC029896-001
3HAC029903-001
3HAC029903-002
3HAC029903-003
3HAC029903-004
3HAC029903-005
3HAC029903-007
3HAC030198-001
3HAC030198-002
3HAC030198-003
3HAC030198-004
3HAC030198-005
3HAC030936-001
3HAC031683-001
3HAC031683-002
3HAC031683-003
3HAC031683-004
3HAC031851-001
3HAC031924-001
3HAC031924-002
3HAC031924-003
3HAC031924-004
3HAC032296-001
3HAC032585-001
3HAC032694-001
3HAC032695-001
3HAC032696-001
3HAC033082-001
3HAC033548-005
3HAC033548-010
3HAC034169-001
3HAC035219-004
3HAC035320-001
3HAC035346-001
3HAC035346-002
3HAC035346-006
3HAC035759-001
3HAC035762-001
3HAC035763-001
3HAC035802-001
3HAC036567-001
3HAC038411-001
3HAC038411-002
3HAC038411-003
3HAC038411-004
3HAC038411-005
3HAC038411-006
3HAC038782-001
3HAC039515-001
3HAC039602-001
3HAC039602-002
3HAC039602-003
3HAC039602-009
3HAC039602-016
3HAC039603-001
3HAC039603-002
3HAC039603-003
3HAC039603-008
3HAC039603-010
3HAC039603-019
3HAC040319-001
3HAC040319-002
3HAC040319-003
3HAC040319-011
3HAC040319-012
3HAC040503-001
3HAC040503-002
3HAC040503-003
3HAC040503-004
3HAC040503-007
3HAC042840-001
3HAC043964-001
3HAC044259-001
3HAC044657-001
3HAC044694-001
3HAC046528-001
3HAC046530-001
3HAC046531-001
3HAC046549-001
3HAC048464-001
3HAC049089-001
3HAC049089-004
3HAC049089-005
3HAC049089-006
3HAC049089-007
3HAC049555-001
3HAC050792-001
3HAC053924-001
3HAC055517-001
3HAC055518-001
3HAC055518-002
3HAC055518-003
3HAC055518-004
3HAC055518-005
3HAC056165-001
3HAC057784-001
3HAC058040-001
3HAC059674-001
3HAC061283-001
3HAC061139-001
3HAC061329-003
3HAC061402-002
3HAC062423-001
3HAC062424-001
3HAC062425-001
3HAC062426-001
3HAC063487-001
3HAC063488-001
3HAC063489-001
3HAC068917-001
3HAC068918-001
3HAC070102-001
3HAC075000-001
3HAC071491-001
3HAC073346-001
3HAC082235-001
3HAC084673-001
3HAC11440-1
3HAC11266-1
3HAC13176-2
3HAC14139-1
3HAC14140-1
3HAC14860-1
3HAC14860-2
3HAC14860-3
3HAC14860-4
3HAC14940-1
3HAC15619-1
3HAC16331-1
3HAC1855-1
3HAC1856-1
3HAC2492-1
3HAC2493-1
3HAC2512-1
3HAC2529-1
3HAC2530-1
3HAC2535-1
3HAC2539-1
3HAC2540-1
3HAC2560-1
3HAC2564-1
3HAC2566-1
3HAC2566-2
3HAC2572-1
3HAC2839-1
3HAC3346-1
3HAC3347-1
3HAC3348-1
3HAC3349-1
3HAC3353-1
3HAC3354-1
3HAC3355-1
3HAC3356-1
3HAC4050-1
3HAC4137-1
3HAC4791-1
3HAC5958-1
3HAC7370-1
3hac7962-1
3hac7964-1
3HAC7996-1
3HAC7996-5
3HAC7996-6
3HAC7996-7
3HAC7996-8
3HAC7998-1
3HAC7998-2
3HAC7998-3
3HAC7998-4
3hac8009-1
3HAC8182-1
3HAC8182-2
3HAC8182-3
3HAC8182-4
3HAC8183-1
3HAC8183-2
3HAC8183-3
3HAC8183-4
3HAC9038-1
3HAC9038-2
3HAC9038-3
3HAC9038-4
3HAC9328-1
3HNE00188-1
3HEA800736-001
3HEA801277-003
3HEA801340-005
3HEA802409-001
3HEA802409-010
3HNA024941-001
3HNE00311-1
3HXD1249-30
3HXD1250-30
3HXD1250-70
3HXD1250-300
Shipping Notes
- Free Standard Shipping on $100+ Orders to the USA.
- Except Preorder products are shipped in 48 hours.
- Delivery to the USA:
- Standard Shipping : 3-10 business days
- If time is of the essence, please consider selecting expedited delivery for faster service.
Exchange/Return Notes
- We offer a 30-day return/exchange service after receiving.
- Final sale items are not eligible for returns or exchanges.
- To process your return/exchange, please contact us at [email protected]
- Please click here for more details>>> Return & Exchange Policy
4.6 ★★★★★
Based on 466 reviews
Sort
Product Reviews
★★★★★ 3
Good to excellent content - terrible publishing policy
Format: Hardcover
Lewis (Not "Flewis") wrote a decent text a number of years ago. It was then expanded to a companion volume (Analytical Sedimentology) with another author. The two nicely complement each other but the mind boggles at a price of almost $100 per each. The publisher has clearly made little effort to control the cost. Redundancy between the two volumes is excessive, hard cover rather than soft is used and, indeed, both could easily have been combined in one less pricey volume. A valuable resource to students and professionals has therefore been compromised by publisher, author or both due to ignorance, greed or stupidity. A terrible shame!
WAS THIS REVIEW HELPFUL?YesReportShare
Reviewed in the United States on January 5, 1998
★★★★★ 5
An Excellent Introduction to Legal and Constitutional Reasoning
Format: Hardcover
This is an excellent introductory volume for people who feel confused by the debate over "original intent" versus a "living Constitution." David A. Strauss is a law professor at the University of Chicago. His book is a quick read (139 pages), with no notes, bibliography or other impedimenta - just an index. It's a very lucid explanation of legal reasoning and how the Supreme Court has followed this basic process over time. Hence the "living constitution" is really just an instance of the English common law tradition functioning normally. This book will teach many Americans how legal reasoning actually operates in practice. It is a common-sensical and conservative process that seeks at once to promote predictability and fairness. By and large, it has worked well.
The phrase "living Constitution" has been denigrated by people who seek to turn back the calendar to a day when more "traditional" values were imposed by law. In so doing, they have invoked an historical fiction, the "original intent" of the framers of the Constitution. The myriad problems arising from this effort, if not its disingenuousness, have been discussed with insight and erudition by such excellent minds as Jack Rakove ("Original Meanings")and Akhil Reed Amar ("The Bill of Rights," and "The American Constitution: A Biography"), to name just two.
The real point of this book, I think, is to explain basic legal reasoning to a mass audience. This does a great service. It also shows how naturally the common law evolves, how it tends to restrain judicial activism and yet to permit flexibility as times and circumstances change. As Dean Roscoe Pound of the Harvard Law School put it in his book, "The Spirit of the Common Law," the common law is "essentially a mode of judicial and juristic thinking, a mode of treating legal problems rather than a fixed body of definite rules...." This is a critical distinction. Some so-called conservatives insist that judges must simply apply the law like automatons, as if it were a "fixed body of definite rules." They then seek to enlist the founding fathers in declaring what those rules are, or how definite they must be. But as Dean Pound and centuries of legal history demonstrate, this notion is far removed from the truth, and remote from any useful notion of adjudication. All Anglophone law schools, lawyers and judges are engaged in the process Dean Pound discusses.
The common law tradition arose in England over the course of centuries. We imported it to this country in part because it was workable and practical, and because it was brilliantly and systematically expounded by Chief Justice Edward Coke in the 17th century and by Lord William Blackstone shortly before the American Revolution. No one would suggest that the common law tradition means the law is the captive of judges' subjective whims. Such an assertion would have sounded ludicrous to the English as well as to the founders. But as Strauss - and volumes of legal history - unsurprisingly demonstrate, the common law tradition is the key to constitutional interpretation.
The common law is an inherently conservative instrument. It evolves incrementally. Those who complain about the "living Constitution" argue that judges merely rule according to their subjective prejudices. They contend that it is the legislative branch that should be charged with interpreting the Constitution. Of course, all three branches of government must interpret the Constitution from time to time. But the legislative branch should not have the last word in determining whether its own enactments meet constitutional scrutiny: To borrow from Chief Justice Coke, no one (including the legislature) may be the judge of his own cause. The function of determining whether legislation conforms to the Constitution has been and still is wisely confided to the courts, which by virtue of centuries of practice (as reflected in published opinions) have substantial expertise in the area and are independent. One also hears complaints that judges are insulated from reality. But courts are not insulated - they are independent. And they are independent precisely so they are not subject to being influenced by lobbyists or terrified by a challenger in a primary election.
To show how the common law works, Strauss discusses the evolution of constitutional thought in relation to two major issues: freedom of speech and segregation in public schools. He explains how the "clear and present danger" test in freedom of speech cases evolved, implicating not just such considerations as the threat of imminent harm, but also that some kinds of speech have lower societal value (libel, obscenity, fighting words), while other kinds of speech have more societal value (great literature, political speech).
Strauss goes on to discuss how Brown v. Board of Education (1954) was far less a radical overturning of an entrenched precedent, Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), than a logical step in the development of the law. In so doing, he uses an example from the law of torts, where customers injured by dangerous products originally were barred from suing the manufacturer unless they had a contractual relationship with it. At first, the fact that a product was inherently dangerous overcame the requirement of a contractual relationship. As it became harder to draw a line between ordinary products and those that were inherently dangerous, however, the old requirement of a contractual relationship was found to have outworn its purpose and customers were permitted to sue the manufacturer who had created a foreseeable risk of harm. Thus, in products liability cases, as in racial equality cases, the law evolved to meet the new demands posed by changed circumstances. Strauss shows the development of the law by discussing cases on racial equality decided after Plessy that gradually undercut the Plessy decision until it was no longer tenable.
Strauss does what law professors do every day: teach the law by showing how it evolved. His explanation, however, is so concise and clear that it makes the discussion seem not just sensible but compelling. Thus we see that the law works.
As Strauss points out, we never wrangle over some constitutional issues because they are cut and dried (you have to be 30 years old to be a senator) or because certainty is required (January 20 is the day the new president takes office, no matter how unstable the current domestic or world situation). Other provisions require more effort to interpret, but this is because the founders brilliantly provided that some matters could be spelled out specifically in advance, while others would have to be expressed in more general terms, which could be adjusted to changing needs and times (e.g., the "necessary and proper" clause in Article I, Sec. 8).
Interestingly, Strauss does not consider amendments to the Constitution to be part of what makes it a living document, since the amendment process is so onerous, slow, and seldom used. He points out how some amendments merely ratified the status quo, or served to clean up outliers, resolved technical issues, or were ahead of their time. As he offers these judgments, which seem balanced and reasonable, he also explains some of the less familiar amendments in a way that will have readers raising their eyebrows and saying "Oh, so that's where that came from."
At the outset of the book, Strauss sets out three objections to originalism:
That it is often, as a practical matter, impossible even for professional historians to discover what the intentions were of various founders with respect to matters discussed in the Constitution.
That even if an intent of the founders could be discovered, it would pertain to the understanding they had about their world: how does one go about trying to fit that understanding to our world?
That as Thomas Jefferson pointed out, one generation is to another as one sovereign nation is to another. The world belongs to the living. The notions of people long dead cannot bind us in the present or future.
Strauss correctly observes that the third of these objections is by itself fatal to originalism.
The founders were not so impressed with themselves that they felt their "intentions" should be forever imposed on posterity. Had they been dedicated to such a dubious project, they would surely have done a better job of documenting their debates and compromises during the Philadelphia convention. But little remains of those deliberations aside from the notes kept by James Madison. The Constitution, moreover, reflects their understanding that the future could not be shackled forever to the time in which they lived. They realized that the slave trade, for example, would prove intolerable and therefore provided that it could be abolished by at least 1808. So was their "original intent" to permit the slave trade, or was it that the slave trade should be abolished? And what does this say, if anything, about their intentions toward the institution of slavery - a word that did not even appear in the Constitution until the Thirteenth Amendment was adopted in 1865?
Most damning of all to the originalist position is what Thomas Jefferson said on the subject.
In a letter dated July 12, 1816, to Samuel Kercheval, Jefferson wrote
"Some men look at constitutions with sanctimonious reverence, and deem them like the arc of the covenant, too sacred to be touched. They ascribe to the men of the preceding age a wisdom more than human, and suppose what they did to be beyond amendment. I knew that age well; I belonged to it, and labored with it. It deserved well of its country. It was very like the present, but without the experience of the present; and forty years of experience in government is worth a century of book-reading; and this they would say themselves, were they to rise from the dead. I am certainly not an advocate for frequent and untried changes in laws and constitutions. I think moderate imperfections had better be borne with; because, when once known, we accommodate ourselves to them, and find practical means of correcting their ill effects. But I know also, that laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind. As that becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths disclosed, and manners and opinions change with the change of circumstances, institutions must advance also, and keep pace with the times. We might as well require a man to wear still the coat which fitted him when a boy, as civilized society to remain ever under the regimen of their barbarous ancestors."
He added, "Let us follow no such examples nor weakly believe that one generation is not as capable as another of taking care of itself, and of ordering its own affairs." He even called for revision of the constitution at stated periods.
While originalists would love to claim Jefferson as one of their own, his words - and indeed his whole life - prove that he was completely at odds with their approach.
Men like Jefferson and Franklin, who were devotees of science, were fascinated by the progress men could make in trying to understand and improve their lives. Jefferson was an eager student of nature and did considerable experimentation with crops on his plantation. He famously wrote his "Notes on the State of Virginia" to refute the widely read claims of the French naturalist Buffon about the supposedly weak, degenerate, and insipid life forms to be found in the New World. The idea that such men, who were committed to the growth of knowledge, would seek to confine all future generations to the limited understanding they possessed of the universe in 1787, is worse than laughable. It can only be explained by the polemical purposes of those whose arguments for a regressive social order are so feeble that they have to seek refuge behind an imaginary "original intent" that they erect - as if the founders wanted their limited knowledge and often unarticulated, conflicting, or ambivalent intentions to restrict the great national experiment forever.
Given the explicit language of Thomas Jefferson, quoted above, it is apparent that "originalism" actually belies and defies the express intent of Jefferson, one of the most eminent of the founders. It seems paradoxical but it was his original intent that his original intent should not govern future generations!
Original intent also appears anomalously restrictive when one considers that the founders never contemplated the existence of an Air Force, though they expressly provided for the Army and the Navy. And ask an originalist what the original intent was with respect to the Second Amendment's use of the term "arms." The founders had no concept of assault rifles or machine guns, let alone nerve gas, laser-guided bombs, predator drones, or nuclear weapons. How do we impose an intention on them to assert what they could not have foreseen, namely, that ordinary householders in the 21st century should have a personal, constitutional right to be able to obliterate a small army in a matter of seconds, based on the founders' notions about the 18th century saber, musket or pistol? Likewise, the Eleventh Amendment says nothing to prohibit a person from suing her own state - just other states. Yet even "textualists" read an unwritten provision into the Eleventh Amendment because it suits their view of how "sovereign" the states should be. When given this kind of a taste of their own medicine, originalists collapse in helpless sputtering and exasperation.
Exposed to Strauss' very sensible discussion, the concerns of originalists reflect opportunism and disingenuousness. After all, we should not expect lawyers and judges to become armchair historians, especially under the time pressures of litigation and in the face of hotly contested issues. We should not pretend the founders had some monolithic intent, least of all with respect to matters of which they had no concept. And as Jefferson pointed out, the relationship of one generation to another is like that of one sovereign nation to another: we cannot expect to bind future generations by the intentions of people who are long since dead.
In short, there will always be those who resist change and those who welcome it. If you really want to see "judicial activism" at work, you will not find much of it in the common law tradition. A far better example is the recent decision - by the so-called conservatives on the Supreme Court - in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.
WAS THIS REVIEW HELPFUL?YesReportShare
Reviewed in the United States on May 18, 2010
★★★★★ 5
An Excellent Read
Format: Kindle
The author talks about our constitution as a "living document" and expertly draws the distinction between this and the originalist interpretation as a "dead document."
WAS THIS REVIEW HELPFUL?YesReportShare
Reviewed in the United States on October 5, 2018
★★★★★ 4
The Constitution: A Living or Static Document
Format: Hardcover
There has been a debate over the past several decades on whether the US Constitution is a living document that should be interpreted according to current mores and standards or whether it is a static document that should be interpreted using only the meaning found in the original wording of the document.
The author, in this book, makes the case that the Constitution is, in fact, a living document that should be interpreted by modern standards and by using principles of common law. There are examples given that, quite frankly, are very persuasive. For instance, if the Constitution were interpreted using original language, we would not have the freedom of speech that we now enjoy. A careful reading of the First Amendment will show that only Congress was prohibited from making laws that abridged free speech. There were no constraints on the states or on other governmental bodies.
Whether or not you agree with the author on how the Constitution should be interpreted, this book will make for some though provoking reading and interesting discussion. The book was well written, fairly easy to understand and should be read by all who are concerned about where the Supreme Court is now and where it is headed.
WAS THIS REVIEW HELPFUL?YesReportShare
Reviewed in the United States on May 23, 2010
★★★★★ 5
Clear, cogent, and illuminating
Format: Kindle
Clear, cogent, and illuminating explanation of the difference between two approaches to interpreting the Constitution: originalism and the Living Constitution
WAS THIS REVIEW HELPFUL?YesReportShare
Reviewed in the United States on September 18, 2015
recommand products
GIBSON EXHAUST Cat-Back Single Exhaust System Stainless 618708
282.48
G-FORCE Helmet Skirt Red 4240RD
63.95
CHEVROLET PERFORMANCE Valve Cover Kit SBC Circle Track Steel Black 25534359
161.47
CHEVROLET PERFORMANCE O-Ring Seal LSX Block Rear Cover 19166181
26.95
CHEVROLET PERFORMANCE Starter Bolt 11610633
27.95